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ARTICLES
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS, BREACH OF
THE REGULATORY CONTRACT, AND THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL*
THOMAS W. MERRILL**
Professors Baumol and Merrill reply to Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, published last year in this Review, which argued that the
price incumbents may charge potential competitors for bottleneck facilities under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 should be based not on fonvard-looking costs
but on historical costs. Professors Baumol and Merrill contend that pricing with
reference to historical costs would depart from the principles called for by eco-
nomic analysis for efficient pricing and they further argue that neither the Takings
Clause nor the regulatory contract precludes the use of forward-looking costs in
setting prices. If a taking or regulatory breach does occur, they suggest that the
proper remedy is not to interfere with the pricing decisions readied by regulators
but to make the appropriate compensation, if any, after those decisions have been
put into effecL Support for these legal observations is reinforced with the economic
contentions that the competition introduced by the Act will have minimal effect
upon incumbents which will generally receive a very valuable quid pro quo for any
damage to their legitimate interests. Finally, they argue that compensating any finn
for the loss of monopolistic prices threatens to undermine the most basic purpose of
the Aci; which is to bring the benefits of competition and competitive pricing to all
electronic communications markets.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber raise a
number of constitutional and economic objections to the introduction
of competition into industries formerly served by regulated monopo-
lies.1 Focusing on both the electricity and local telephone industries,
they argue that the opening of a monopolized market to competition
may result in capture by new entrants of the incumbent monopoly's
* Director, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University and Se-
nior Research Economist and Professor Emeritus, Princeton University. B.SS., 1942, City
College of New York; Ph.D., 1949, University of London.
** John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., 1971, Grinnell
College; B.A., 1973, Oxford University;, J.D., 1977, University of Chicago. The authors
have provided consulting and legal services to AT&T Corp. in connection with the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, and funding for this article was provided by AT&T.
1 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 851 (1996).
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most profitable customers.2 The result, at least in the short term, may
be that the incumbents are left with revenues insufficient to recover
the costs of investments they made when it was assumed that they
would continue to operate as monopoists.3 Sidak and Spulber argue
that both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 4 and general
principles of contract law5 impose significant constraints on govern-
mental efforts to deregulate public utility monopolies when the intro-
duction of competition creates such a "stranded investment"
problem.6
The Sidak and Spulber thesis has moved very rapidly from the
pages of academic journals to regulatory tribunals and courtrooms.
The appearance of the article coincided with efforts by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and state public utility commis-
sions (PUCs) to carry out key provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 19967 (Act) designed to bring competition to local telephony.
Their article has been relied upon in these proceedings by incumbent
local exchange carriers (LECs) to support the proposition that the
prices they may charge potential competitors for access to critical bot-
tleneck facilities (like the copper wire loops that connect individual
homes and businesses with the local network) must be set at levels
high enough to permit them to recover all the revenues they expected
to earn from their local exchange network before the coming of
competition.8
In particular, Sidak and Spulber have been enlisted in support of
the proposition that prices for local bottleneck facilities should not be
set solely on the basis of forward-looking costs, that is, the costs of
replicating or replacing the inputs used to provide discrete network
elements or services.9 Most economists, joined by the FCC and the
majority of state PUCs, believe that rational decisions on the pricing
of unbundled network elements and access to local networks must be
based on forward-looking costs. Sidak and Spulber, in contrast, argue
2 See id. at 875-79.
3 See id. at 878-83.
4 This clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
5 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 931-33 (including principles of promissory
estoppel and formal contract law).
6 See id. at 918-26, 938-68.
7 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
8 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 876-79 (noting argument that open access
provisions transfer income from incumbent's investors and captive customers to entrant's
investors and customers).
9 See generally Affidavit of J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, CC Dkt. No. 96-
262 (Jan. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Sidak-Spulber Affidavit].
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that once constitutional and regulatory contract considerations are
factored in, a vital component of a legitimate pricing method is atten-
tion to the historical costs of the assets of the firm whose prices are in
question. In so arguing, they are saying that the law requires a funda-
mental departure from the principles called for by economic analysis
for efficient pricing.
This Article comments, both from a legal and an economic view-
point, on the Sidak and Spulber contentions as they apply to the local
competition provisions of the Act. In Part I, we make two central
legal observations. The first is that neither the Takings Clause nor the
regulatory contract precludes the use of forward-looking costs in set-
ting prices for network elements or access to local exchange service.
Thus, if regulators decide on economic policy grounds to adopt for-
ward-looking prices, no one can claim that this is unconstitutional on
its face. Of course, forward-looking pricing, like any method for es-
tablishing prices by regulation, may be applied in individual cases in a
way that introduces an unconstitutional taking. But it cannot be
maintained that this method inevitably or always will produce such a
result as a matter of law.
Our second legal observation concerns remedies. Sidak and
Spulber maintain in effect that takings and regulatory contract con-
cerns must be addressed in the opening round of the implementation
of the Act. The task of regulators and courts, they implicitly assert, is
to prevent any taking or breach of contract from ever happening, even
if this means compromising on the pricing principles required by eco-
nomic efficiency. Ordinarily, however, the Takings Clause and the law
of contracts are not thought to give rise to what amounts to an injunc-
tive remedy. Instead, they are thought to guarantee only a right to
just compensation after a taking or breach occurs. This suggests that
the proper remedy is not to interfere with the pricing decisions
reached by regulators on economic policy grounds, but to allow those
decisions to be put into effect and then, after the Act is fully imple-
mented, to determine whether there is any taking of property or
breach of contract that remains uncompensated.
Our support for these legal observations is reinforced in Part II
by economic considerations. First, we show that there is good reason
to expect that if there is any stranded investment created by the Act, it
will be relatively modest. We cannot predict the exact magnitude of
the potential stranded investment problem, but we are able to contrast
instructively the cases of telecommunications and electricity.
For example, whereas the introduction of competition into the
electric industry is likely to produce enormous redundancy of plant
and equipment for incumbent utilities in the short run, such redun-
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dancy will be minimal for incumbent LECs. This is because entry into
the local telecommunications industry, at least initially, will largely oc-
cur through leasing by competing LECs of portions of the facilities
owned by incumbent LECs, rather than by competitors' construction
of new facilities. As long as the rental prices for existent facilities are
compensatory, as appropriately determined forward-looking cost
based prices are, these facilities will remain fully employed and hence
cannot be said to represent stranded investment.
In addition, electric generating plants have basically only one use,
and thus easily can be made redundant if competitors emerge with
cheaper sources of power. The physical plant used in local telecom-
munications, in contrast, is readily adaptable to other uses besides
placement or receipt of telephone calls. This has already been demon-
strated by the introduction of facsimile transmissions and the Internet;
many believe cable television transmission and remote video transmis-
sion to be just around the corner. Thus, if incumbent LECs lose part
of the local exchange market to competitors, they nevertheless may be
able to redeploy their plant to serve emerging markets, thereby fur-
ther minimizing or preventing redundancy.
Perhaps most important, the electric utilities will receive no auto-
matic quid pro quo for any losses from stranded investment that they
sustain as a result of competitive entry. In contrast, under the Tele-
communications Act the LECs are expected to receive extremely val-
uable compensation in exchange for the advent of local competition,
in the form of permission to embark on interexchange (long distance)
telecommunications service. The adequacy of this compensation is at
least arguably demonstrated by the LECs' own role in pushing for the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act, for their attempt to obtain
permission to enter these other markets (in full awareness that it was
likely to entail the introduction of competition into the local arena)
was a key element in the support of the legislation.10
In short, there is reason to believe that the local competition in-
troduced by the Act will have minimal, if any, effect upon the LECs in
the form of stranding of investment, and that they can expect to re-
ceive a very valuable quid pro quo for any damage to their legitimate
interests. These considerations powerfully reinforce the legal conclu-
sion that there is no legitimate basis to enjoin the use of economically
efficient pricing principles in the initial stages of execution of the Act.
10 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment
on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 217, 223-25 (1996) (distinguishing local
exchange companies and interexchange companies).
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The second economic consideration we address in Part I involves
the serious distortions that an uncritical use of the Sidak and Spulber
thesis could introduce in the local competition required by the Act.
Their approach appears to call for compensating the LEGS for the loss
of supercompetitive prices for their services. We believe that neither
economics nor law entitles any firm to compensation for the loss of
monopolistic prices, that is, the loss of earnings or prices made possi-
ble only as a result of the current and past monopoly power of the
firm in question. The Sidak and Spulber thesis therefore threatens to
undermine the most basic purpose of the Telecommunications Act,
which is to bring the benefits of competition and competitive pricing
to all electronic communications markets. This is yet another reason
to permit pricing to be determined on economic principles and to
leave questions of just compensation to be resolved after the Act has
been fully carried out.
I
THE LEGAL CONTENTIONS
In their article, Sidak and Spulber identify two principal legal
constraints on the adoption of a competitive access scheme such as
that reflected in the Telecommunications Act. The first is based on
the Supreme Court's decisions applying the Takings Clause to public
utility ratemaking.11 The Court has held that rates may not be set at
"confiscatory" levels, meaning that regulated utilities must be given
an opportunity to earn a reasonable return on their investment.12
Sidak and Spulber argue that the introduction of competition into lo-
cal exchange service will result in the stranding of a significant portion
of the LECs' fixed plant investment, and unless the prices charged for
access to the LEGs' bottleneck facilities are adjusted so as to permit
recovery of these stranded costs, the LEGS will have been denied the
opportunity to earn the fair return on investment that the Takings
Clause requires.13
The second constraint identified by Sidak and Spulber is that the
local competition provisions may constitute a breach of what they call
"the regulatory contract" between the LEGS and the government.
1 4
11 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 953-59.
12 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (holding that if rates do not
provide sufficient compensation, utility's investment will be taken without just compensa-
tion, contravening Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 605 (1944) (same).
13 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 878-79.
14 See id. at 879-83 (providing general summation of regulatory contract and its devel-
opment as legal concept, as well as potential remedies for its breach). The more conven-
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They argue that investors have been induced to provide financing to
the LECs for the acquisition of costly assets in reliance on certain crit-
ical promises by regulators, including the promise that the LECS will
enjoy a monopoly in the provision of local exchange service within
their service areas and the promise that they will be allowed to re-
cover the full cost of all of their past investments that regulators have
determined to be prudent.15 Sidak and Spulber contend that the in-
troduction of competition is inconsistent with these alleged
promises.16 They believe that these abrogations of the regulatory con-
tract should be regarded either as an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty rights-the property rights here being the contractual obligations
associated with the regulatory contract-or simply as a breach of
contract. 17
We will not attempt a point by point response to each of the argu-
ments and authorities Sidak and Spulber adduce in support of these
contentions in their lengthy article. Instead, we will confine our legal
discussion to two central observations. First, neither the Supreme
Court's confiscation decisions nor the idea of a regulatory contract
supports the contention that regulators must consider historical costs
in setting prices for unbundled network elements or access to local
networks. All they require is that regulators permit utilities to earn a
risk adjusted competitive return on their investment. Second, the
most important issue here is probably one of remedy: should courts
enjoin the use of forward-looking prices by the FCC and the state
commissions if courts think that approach may cause a taking or
breach of contract, or should courts allow forward-looking prices to
take effect and remit the LECs to what amounts to a damages remedy
if it turns out, after the Act is fully implemented, that a taking or
breach of contract has occurred? We submit that in the pursuit of the
far reaching goals of the Act, compensation after the fact makes far
more sense.
A. Established Constitutional Doctrine
Does Not Require Recovery of Historical Costs
1. The Takings Clause
It cannot be claimed that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Takings Clause to require that regulators consider the historical costs
tional terminology is "regulatory compact," but to avoid confusion we adopt Sidak and
Spulber's phrase here.
15 See id. at 879-83, 954-59.
16 See id. at 883-87 (describing receipt of protected franchise as form of consideration
that introduction of competition would destroy).
17 See id. at 918-26, 938-68.
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of investments in setting rates for regulated public utilities. Ever since
its 1944 decision in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.,18 the Court consistently has maintained that regulators are "not
bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in
determining rates."'19 Thus, in effect, the Constitution is neutral as be-
tween different rate setting methods, such as the "prudent invest-
ment" approach based on historical costs or the "fair value" method
based on replacement costs. In a more recent decision, Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch,20 the Court reaffirmed this neutrality.;' Indeed,
the Court specifically rejected the suggestion that it adopt the prudent
investment approach as the constitutional standard, noting that this
would "foreclose a return to some form of the fair value rule just as its
practical problems may be diminishing."22
What then is the constitutional measure of whether a rate order is
confiscatory? In both Hope and Duquesne the Court indicated that
the key question is whether the rate of return on investment is "com-
mensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks."2 3 Thus, the constitutional inquiry entails deter-
mining (1) the risk of the regulated enterprise; (2) the competitive
rate of return available in capital markets on other investments having
comparable risks; (3) a projection of the total effect of the rate order
on the actual rate of return of the regulated enterprise; and (4) a de-
18 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
19 Id. at 602; see also FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380,390-91 (1974) (acknowledging
permissibility of multiple methods of calculating rate structures); Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968) (noting that "any rate selected by the [regulator] from the
broad zone of reasonableness permitted by the [Natural Gas] Act cannot properly be at-
tacked as confiscatory"); Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548,567 (1945)
(acknowledging appropriate use of multiple methods of valuation in various circum-
stances); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,586 (1942) (noting that courts lack
authority to set aside any "reasonable rate" adopted by Commission that is consistent wiAth
constitutional requirements).
20 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
21 See id. at 316 ("The adoption of a single theory of valuation as a constitutional re-
quirement would be inconsistent with the view of the Constitution this Court has taken
since Hope Natural Gas ...
22 Id. at 316 n.10.
23 Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; see also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314 ("One of the elements
always relevant to setting the rate under Hope is the return investors expect given the risk
of the enterprise."); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923) ("A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return ... equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part
of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corre-
sponding risks and uncertainties."). See generally Stephen F. Williams, Fixing the Rate of
Return After Duquesne, 8 Yale J. Reg. 159 (1991) (advocating fixing rate of return as
expected rate of return on alternative investments of equivalent risk).
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termination of whether the projected rate of return deviates materi-
ally from the competitively required rate of return.
It has been suggested, most prominently by Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion in Duquesne, that even if regulators are not re-
quired to consider historical costs directly, courts may be required to
consider them indirectly insofar as they must decide what "rate base"
counts for purposes of computing the projected rate of return. 24 Jus-
tice Scalia is right that some conception of the rate base is required for
this purpose. But he was wrong to suggest that the benchmark must
be a prudent investment or historical cost rate base. As the majority
recognized in Duquesne, although the prudent investment method has
traditionally looked to historical costs in establishing the rate base, the
equally venerable "fair value" method2s looks to the investment that
is "used and useful" to the public in fixing the allowable rate base.26
The used and useful test does not ask what investment was historically
determined to be prudent, but rather what investment currently is be-
ing used to provide service to the public. In other words, it is forward-
looking rather than backward-looking.
For purposes of determining the projected rate of return, there is
no reason why a reviewing court cannot simply employ whatever mea-
sure of the rate base that has been adopted by regulators. Of course,
some methods of defining the rate base entail greater risks for utili-
ties, and switching "back and forth between methodologies" in defin-
ing the rate base must enhance risk.27 But as long as the court
remembers that the competitive return must be established by exam-
ining investments of comparable risk, and recognizes that risk is in
part a function of the chosen rate base (and of the consistency with
which the definition of the rate base is applied), the Takings Clause
analysis can be carried out using as a benchmark whatever the regula-
tory jurisdiction itself deems to be the proper rate base.28
24 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 377 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25 The Court's decision in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), is regarded as having
ruled that the fair value method is constitutionally compelled. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at
308. In at least three subsequent decisions, the Court required that telephone property be
valued at current fair value, rather than at historical cost, for purposes of establishing local
telephone rates. See West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1935);
Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1923);
City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 324 (1922).
26 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308-09.
27 See id. at 315; see also id. at 310-12 n.7 (discussing need for "risk premium" in al-
lowed rate of return if jurisdiction adopts unusual or hybrid definition of rate base).
28 For example, suppose a jurisdiction decided to disallow from the rate base all invest-
ments over $1 million. Such a method would impose severe inefficiencies on utilities and
would present very large risks. But as long as these risks could be quantified, it would still
be possible to determine whether the projected revenues under a rate order would trans-
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In short, the confiscation cases provide no basis to declare uncon-
stitutional on its face an access pricing standard that adopts a forward-
looking rather than historical standard for cost determination. The
only significant constraint imposed by these cases is that a utility must
be allowed an opportunity to earn a competitive return on its invest-
ment, with competitive return understood to mean the return that
would be demanded by investors for investments of comparable risk.
Thus, a method based on forward-looking costs, including the current
cost of replacement of the physical plant that is used and useful in
serving the public, is unquestionably a constitutionally permissible op-
tion. One element of risk, of course, is the risk that particular invest-
ments will be excluded from the rate base-will be "stranded" either
by operation of law or the forces of competition. But as long as the
rate of return is set at a level that provides adequate compensation for
the risk of stranded plant, there is no reason in principle why a system
that sets access prices on the basis of forward-looking costs cannot
satisfy the confiscation standard.29
2. The Regulatory Contract
Turning to Sidak and Spulber's regulatory contract contention,
we also find no basis for the claim that regulators must provide for
recovery of historical costs. The critical legal variable that Sidak and
Spulber overlook is what the Court has recently called the "unmis-
takability doctrine. '30 This doctrine asserts that promises by the gov-
ernment to forbear from certain types of future regulatory action-in
other words, promises of the sort said to be included in the regulatory
contract-will be enforced by the courts only if they are set forth in
"unmistakable" language. Viewed through this lens, we find that the
late into a rate of return that would be constitutionally adequate, given the risks associated
with the use of this rate base. Thus, if the under S1 million rate base was determined to be
so risky that comparable investments would command a 50% annual return, the question
would be whether the allowed revenues would translate into a 50% return or better on this
particular rate base.
29 The FCC has indicated that the question of what rate of return should be adopted in
setting prices for unbundled network elements should be left to the determination of indi-
vidual state public utility commissions (PUCs). See Implementation of the Local Competi-
tion Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98, 95-185, 11
F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order], vacated in part sub nom.
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18183 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
30 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S.Ct. 2432,2453 (1996) (stating that waivers
of sovereign power generally must be surrendered in unmistakable terms); United States v.
Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700,707 (1987) (same); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to
Soc. See. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,52 (1986) (same). The doctrine is of considerable antiq-
uity and can be traced in this country to the decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419, 458 (1837) (holding that public grants are to be construed
strictly, or else government would be disarmed of necessary powers).
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scope of the regulatory contract that would be regarded as enforcea-
ble by courts is considerably less sweeping than urged by Sidak and
Spulber.
In testimony fied after the publication of their article, Sidak and
Spulber have argued that the Court's recent decision in United States
v. Winstar,31 which discusses the unmistakability doctrine at length,
supports their regulatory contract contention.32 An examination of
Winstar, however, indicates that the Court in fact reaffirmed the doc-
trine in its traditional form. At the height of the savings and loan
crisis, federal regulators promised certain healthy savings and loans
(S&Ls) that they would receive a favorable accounting treatment if
they acquired failing S&Ls. Later, as part of a comprehensive effort
to reform the industry, Congress passed legislation that proscribed the
use of this accounting treatment. At issue in the case was whether the
federal government could be sued for breach of contract by the ac-
quiring S&Ls.
Four Justices joined in Justice Souter's plurality opinion, which
would have recognized an exception to the unmistakability doctrine
for government "indemnification" agreements holding entities harm-
less in the event of future changes in regulation.33 However, a major-
ity of five Justices rejected such an exception. Justice Scalia, joined by
two other Justices, saw no need to create the exception, because in his
view the contracts in question unmistakably promised the acquiring
S&Ls they would receive favorable accounting treatment.3 4 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, joined by one other Justice, also rejected the excep-
tion, but found that the doctrine was not satisfied.35 Thus, by a vote of
five to four, Winstar reaffirmed the unmistakability doctrine and re-
jected Justice Souter's proposed exception. The Court disagreed
about the application of the doctrine in the specific context presented,
but did not call into question the doctrine's continued validity.36
In applying the unmistakability doctrine to the regulatory con-
tract claims advanced by Sidak and Spulber, it is useful to distinguish
among three possible versions of the Sidak and Spulber regulatory
contract argument. First, in return for agreeing to shoulder onerous
31 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
32 See Sidak-Spulber Affidavit, supra note 9, at 37-40.
33 See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2463-69.
34 See id. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35 See id. at 2480 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
36 The only contractual obligation covered by Justice Souter's exception for indemnifi-
cation contracts that would be relevant in the present context would be a promise to shield
utilities against the effects of future regulation, i.e., to guarantee them just compensation
for the public use of their investment over its expected life. This is equivalent to the pro-
tection independently provided by the Takings Clause.
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common carrier obligations, such as the duty to provide universal ser-
vice within a given area, regulators could be said to have promised
that the LECs will have the right to operate as monopolies within
their service areas. Second, in return for accepting a ceiling on what
they can charge consumers, i.e., maximum rate regulation, regulators
could be said to have promised LECs that they will be allowed to
recover fully the historical cost of specific past investments, at least
when these investments were reviewed and approved as prudent by
regulators when they were made. Third, again in return for accepting
maximum rate regulation, regulators could be said to have promised
the LECs that they will be given an opportunity to earn a competitive
return on their investment over its expected useful life. Such a prom-
ise, of course, would be substantially identical to the protection af-
forded utilities under the Court's confiscation decisions.3 7
To show in "unmistakable" terms that any of these promises was
made, it will almost certainly be necessary to point to specific lan-
guage in a corporate charter, franchise agreement, or public utility
statute, or a longstanding judicial doctrine, that expressly reflects
these understandings.38 Implied understandings based on a long
course of dealing, or action taken in reliance on apparently settled
practices, might plausibly be thought to give rise to a contract between
the government and the LECs. But it will be much harder to show
that these practices reflect an unmistakable contractual agreement.
a Monopoly Service Areas. The LECs will have an uphill
struggle to show that they are the beneficiaries of a regulatory con-
tract that includes an unmistakable promise by the government that
they are entitled to maintain monopoly service territories. The most
logical place to look for such language is in franchise agreements per-
mitting LECs to operate in specific communities or areas. But most
such franchise agreements do no more than permit LECs to use public
streets, alleys, and other public rights of way for purposes of con-
structing and maintaining local networks to serve the public.39 This
type of permissive authorization is obviously a far cry from a grant of
monopoly privileges, and is unlikely to be construed as carrying a nec-
essary implication of exclusivity.
37 See supra text accompanying notes 18-29.
38 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S.
451, 466 (1985) (stating presumption that general language of statutes "'is not intended to
create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until
the legislature shall ordain otherwise" (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 US. 74,79
(1937))).
39 See George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regula-
tion" Debate, 36 J.L. & Econ. 289, 303 (1993).
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Whether utility franchise agreements confer monopoly rights was
a much litigated issue in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. Numerous Supreme Court decisions from that era applied the
unmistakability doctrine to deny a claim that monopoly service rights
should be found by implication on the basis of franchise agreements
that do not expressly address the issue 40 As stated in one such case,
"an exclusive right to enjoy a certain franchise is never presumed, and
unless the charter contain words of exclusion, it is no impairment of
the grant to permit another to do the same thing, although the value
of the franchise to the first grantee may be wholly destroyed. '41 Even
where state law has included general provisions reflecting a policy lim-
iting each service area to a single utility, the Court has refused to rec-
ognize any "vested right" in the maintenance of such a policy if the
state subsequently decides to endorse a policy of competition.42 And
even if there is specific language of exclusivity in the franchise agree-
ment or the public utility act, the Court has usually permitted the in-
troduction of competition if the franchise agreement or other source
of authority also includes language reserving the right "to repeal, al-
ter, or amend" the grant.43
Finally, even in the rare case where a LEC can show that it has a
franchise agreement or other contract that promises in unmistakable
terms a monopoly service territory, there would be no reason to infer
from this agreement an additional promise to allow the LEC to charge
40 For decisions reaching this conclusion with respect to a variety of local public utili-
ties, see, e.g., Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Town of Graham, 253 U.S. 193, 195 (1920);
City of Mitchell v. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co., 246 U.S. 396 (1918); Ramapo Water Co. v. City
of New York, 236 U.S. 579 (1915); City of Joplin v. Southeast Mo. Light Co., 191 U.S. 150
(1903); Capital City Light & Fuel Co. v. Tallahassee, 186 U.S. 401 (1902); Skaneateles
Water Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 363 (1902); Bienville Water Supply Co. v.
Mobile, 175 U.S. 109 (1899); Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S.
258 (1892).
41 Pearsall v. Great N. Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 664 (1896).
42 See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939).
43 See, e.g., Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387,
390 (1927) (noting that Arkansas Constitution "reserved to the legislature the power to
alter any corporate charter"); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 249 (1918) (noting that
"the contract inhering in the charter... was subject to the State's reserved power to amend
or repeal" as provided by Ohio Constitution); Ramapo, 236 U.S. at 583 (noting that right
to repeal company charter was reserved in state constitution); Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S.
591, 598-99 (1910) (noting that Grand Rapid Hydraulic Company's charter reserved to
Michigan legislature right to repeal it); Hamilton Gas Light, 146 U.S. at 270 (noting that
"reservation of power to alter or revoke a grant of special privileges necessarily became a
part of the charter of every corporation formed under the general statute providing for the
formation of corporations"); Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13,21-22 (1881) (holding
that, given Massachusetts legislature's right to amend, alter, or repeal corporate charters, it
could grant another corporation "authority to operate a street railroad through the same
streets and over the same ground previously occupied by the Marginal Company").
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monopoly rates. Where utilities have been permitted to operate as
monopolists, they invariably have been subject to rate regulation
designed to eliminate monopoly pricing.44 Thus, so long as a LEC is
given an opportunity to earn a competitive return after the advent of
competition, there would be in any event no damages associated with
the breach of any promise to operate as a monopolist.
b. Recovery of All Historical Costs. The second claimed prom-
ise, that LEGS are entitled to recover fully all investments (or at least
all investments found to be prudent) at their historical costs, is also
one that we believe cannot be established in most cases in unmistaka-
ble language. One serious impediment here is the backdrop of the
confiscation case law which, as we have discussed, has insisted for over
fifty years that regulators are "not bound to the use of any single
formula or combination of formulae in determining rates." 45 During
this period, several courts have held that public utilities, including
LEGs, are not guaranteed the right to recover the full historical costs
of their investments. 46 Nor do the statutes that govern rate proceed-
ings, such as the Federal Communications Act, provide any textual
basis for establishing an unmistakable right to recover all prudent his-
torical costs. These statutes typically speak in much broader generali-
ties about the right to "just and reasonable" rates.47
It is also pertinent to note that the stated rationale of these stat-
utes is to eliminate earnings that represent either a monopoly profit or
excessive costs incurred because of inefficiency.48 Admittedly, these
statutes have not consistently realized these goals. But Sidak and
Spulber's construction of the regulatory contract as protecting incum-
bent utilities' entitlement to any and all forgone earnings of which
they are deprived by the advent of competition-even if those earn-
ings reflect monopoly profits or inefficiencies-is incompatible with
44 The Court has applied the unmistakability doctrine in this context to prevent any
implication of freedom from rate regulation. See, e.g., Covington & Lexington lrnpike
Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1896) (stating that state statute granting turn-
pike road immunity from rate regulation should be narrowly construed).
45 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
46 See, e.g., Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945) (noting
that Due Process Clause "cannot be applied to insure values or to restore values that have
been lost by the operation of economic forces"); Los Angeles Dep't of Airports v. United
States Dep't of Transp., 103 F.3d 1027,1034 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that computing actual
cost does not always require using historical cost); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d
1254, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that "FCC has no obligation ... to include in the rate
base all actual costs for investments").
47 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 201(b) (West Supp. 1997)
(stating that all federally regulated charges "shall be just and reasonable").
48 See, e.g., id. § 151 (stating that goal is to make available efficient wire and radio
communication service).
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the stated purpose (if not the practical effect) of the regulatory
regimes.49
Perhaps even more damaging from a regulatory contract view-
point is the fact that the FCC and most state commissions have turned
away in recent years from traditional prudent investment or rate of
return methods for setting maximum rates, and instead have adopted
incentive regulations such as price caps. 50 These new methods of reg-
ulation do not entail any review or approval of the historical costs of
specific investments. Sidak and Spulber argue that this development
does not negate the regulatory contract.51 But the emergence of wide-
spread incentive regulation is, at the very least, incompatible with the
assertion that the LECs and their investors have acted in reliance on a
contractual promise entitling them to recover the full historical costs
of all prudent investments.
c. Opportunity to Earn a Competitive Return. With respect to
promise three-that LECs will be given an opportunity to earn a rea-
sonable return on their total investment over its expected useful life-
there is no need to search for an unmistakable promise, because if one
exists, it merely restates the confiscation protection provided by Hope
and Duquesne. Both constitutional sources, such as Hope and
Duquesne, and statutory mandates which require that utilities be al-
lowed to charge "just and reasonable" rates or earn "a fair rate of
return," have been consistently interpreted to mean that investors can
expect an opportunity to earn a normal competitive return on their
overall investment.52 In effect, investors have been promised that
they will be allowed a reasonable opportunity-one that fairly bal-
ances investor and consumer interests-to earn over the lifetime of
their investment as much as they would earn, on average, from invest-
ing in a competitive, unregulated industry of equivalent risk. This
49 See Stephen F. Williams, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Con-
tract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1000 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory
Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1007 (1996).
50 The FCC moved to price cap regulation for the interstate services of Bell and GTE
local exchange carriers in 1990. See National Rural Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174,
178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Regulatory reform at the state level began in the late 1980s, with
different combinations of deregulation, price caps, and revenue sharing being adopted in
different states, in each case to provide greater incentives for innovation and cost savings
than were thought to be supplied by traditional rate of return regulation.
51 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 926-28.
52 See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (noting that "the return
to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enter-
prises involving corresponding risks"); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S.
299, 314 (1989) (stating that "[o]ne of the elements always relevant to setting the rate ... is
the return investors expect given the risk of the enterprise").
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means they have been promised recoupment of the replacement costs
of their investments along with a current competitive rate of return.
A competitive return, however, already incorporates full compensa-
tion for the risk of possible innovation that could drive replacement
cost below the value of historical cost. Thus, the promise of a compet-
itive return does not entail a promise of full recovery of historical
costs.
If the regulatory contract includes no more than promise three,
then the scope of judicial protection under the regulatory contract is
at most coextensive with that provided by the confiscation cases. As
we have shown, the confiscation cases provide no basis for concluding
that regulators must permit LECs to recover all their historical costs,
or that forward-looking prices are unconstitutional on their face. That
being the case, the regulatory contract provides no basis for reaching
these conclusions either.
B. The Appropriate Remedy for Any Constitutional Violation
Perhaps more important than any question about the scope of
protection afforded by the Takings Clause and the regulatory contract
are questions about the form and timing of the remedies for violation
of these rights. Here there are two different lines of authority. On the
one hand, some of the confiscation cases (but not all) could be read to
suggest that a public utility company is entitled to a determination of
whether a rate order is confiscatory before the rates are put into ef-
fect.53 These decisions may assume that the "just compensation" re-
quired by the Takings Clause must be supplied by the revenues
generated by the order itself. Under this approach, if a public utility
company persuades a court that the order will deprive it of constitu-
tionally adequate revenues, the court should set aside the order and
require the public utility commission to enter a new order.
On the other hand, there is a broad line of authority asserting
that "[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of
private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit
for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to
the taking."5 4 According to this authority, "the Fifth Amendment
53 See, e.g., Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 302-05; Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 683 (1923); Covington & Lexington Irbmpike Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578,579-80 (1896); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810
F.2d 1168, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 392 (1974)
(holding that where impact of regulatory scheme cannot be determined until it has been
applied in individual cases over period of time, "broadside assertion" that regulation vAil
be confiscatory was premature).
4 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); see Bell Ad. Tel. Cos. v.
FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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does not require that just compensation be paid in advance of or even
contemporaneously with the taking. All that is required is the exist-
ence of a "'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation"' at the time of the taking. '5 5 Thus, if some mechanism
exists for securing monetary relief after the fact-for example through
a suit for damages against the government under the 'fcker Act-
courts should not enjoin a regulatory action alleged to result in a tak-
ing. Instead, they should dismiss such an action as premature and re-
mit the complaining party to its ex post remedy for damages.
5 6
It is clear that the second line of authority reflects the general
rule about remedies for violation of the Takings Clause, and the first
line is at best an unarticulated exception to that rule. This follows
from the modem Court's understanding of the nature of the right es-
tablished by the Fifth Amendment, which, the Court has explained,
"does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the exercise of that power. 57
That condition, moreover, does not "limit the governmental in-
terference with property rights per se;' 58 rather, it imposes a require-
ment of "compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking. '59 Given this conception of the right, if the
government regulates private property but leaves open avenues
whereby the owner of the property may obtain just compensation for
any taking that may be caused by the regulation, then the Takings
Clause has not been violated.
Because the Court has never explained the apparent exception to
this understanding arguably reflected in some of the confiscation
cases, the underlying rationale for this exception remains a matter of
speculation. There are a number of possibilities. We will confine the
discussion in the text to two that appear to be especially germane to
the question of the proper remedy for any constitutional violation
presented by the local competition provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act.60
55 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Regional Rail
Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan-
sas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890))).
56 This conclusion is supported both by the so-called Tflcker Act cases involving takings
by the federal government, see, e.g., id. at 17; Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 124-25, and by
ripeness cases involving takings by state and local governments, see, e.g., Williamson
County Planning Reg'l Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
57 Frst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
314 (1987).
58 Id. at 315.
59 Id.
60 Two other possibilities merit mention. First, the confiscation cases typically involve
orders requiring rate reductions, and, under the statutory schemes governing these orders,
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1. The Finality of Rate Orders
On the one hand, the confiscation cases may rest on the assump-
tion that the responsible administrative tribunal has determined with
finality all issues pertaining to whether there has been an uncompen-
sated taking,61 together with the assumption that the rate order itself
utilities would have no way to recoup lost revenues if the reductions were allowed to go
into effect while the confiscation challenge was being adjudicated. See Burlington N. Inc.
v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1982) (noting that "where there is a dispute about
the appropriate rate the equities favor allowing the carrier's rate to control pending deci-
sion by the Commission, since... the shipper may receive reparations for overpayment
while the carrier can never be made whole after underpayment"); Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370,387-88 (1932) (noting that since car-
rier must conform to rate order, its only remedy is prospective).
This concern does not appear to apply to the introduction of local competition under
the Telecommunications Act, however, because the LECs do have means of being made
whole. The FCC has specifically ruled that it will entertain petitions to adjust prices for
particular LECs if they can show they will have confiscatory effects. See Local Competi-
tion Order, supra note 29, 1 739. Also, as discussed below, LECs that can show that the
FCC and the PUCs have implemented the Telecommunications Act in such a way as to
create a taking or breach of contract should be able to sue the United States for damages
under the Tficker Act.
Second, the cases implicitly holding that confiscatory rate orders can be enjoined may
rest on an unstated concern that such orders may visit irreparable harm on the public. If a
rate order were truly confiscatory, it would at the very least jeopardize the utility's ability
to raise needed capital and could even drive it into bankruptcy. In a world where all utili-
ties are assumed to be natural monopolies, a capital-starved utility or a utility undergoing
reorganization could deprive the public of adequate services.
This explanation, too, has no relevance to the pricing controversies under the Tele-
communications Act. Those controversies arise out of a statutory scheme designed to cre-
ate competition among utilities. In this new world of local exchange service competition, if
prices for network elements and access are set at arguably confiscatory levels, then some
LECs may suffer-indeed, some may go out of business. But if this happens, others should
immediately step in to take their place. Any constitutional infirmities in pricing levels can
be rectified by an action for damages after the fact without jeopardizing public services.
61 The earliest confiscation cases suggest that the only issue before the courts was one
of the adequacy of compensation. Those decisions were based on an analogy to eminent
domain. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,546 (1898) ("The corporation may not be
required to use its property for the benefit of the public without receiving just compensa-
tion for the services rendered by it."); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362,
410 (1894) (stating that use of private property for public use at less than market value is
no less unjust than taking title); Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) ("[Tihe
State cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward;
neither can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation... ."). See generally John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nu-
clear Power The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L Rev. 65,70-
81 (1985) (discussing takings as foundation of constitutional limits on utility rate
regulation).
The "taking" occurred when a utility, such as a railroad, was subjected to common
carrier obligations. Its property in effect had been seized by the state and dedicated to
public use. The only issue before the court, therefore, was whether the rates that the rail-
road was permitted to charge satisfied the "just compensation" requirement that would
prevail in any physical takings case.
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is the only scheme for securing just compensation. On these assump-
tions, the response of a court concluding that a rate order constitutes
an uncompensated taking arguably should be to set it aside (enjoin it)
and direct the administrative tribunal to come up with a constitutional
order. This explanation gains support from the fact that when the
Supreme Court has been confronted with price setting or rate setting
schemes that involve two stages-the imposition of general or area
rate orders, followed by some procedure for seeking individual waiv-
ers or variances from these orders-it has followed the general rule
and has refused to permit the scheme to be enjoined at the first
stage.62
Assuming this explanation adequately accounts for the apparent
exception reflected in the confiscation cases, it has little application to
the controversy over local access prices under the Telecommunica-
tions Act. As discussed in the next Part, it cannot be said that the
question whether the Telecommunications Act works a taking or
breach of contract has been settled with any finality. On the contrary,
the pricing controversies under the Act involve multiple and signifi-
cant uncertainties about whether there is any taking or breach of con-
tract at all. In this sense, the pricing issues under the
Telecommunications Act resemble much more closely the two-stage
rate cases than the one-stage cases. Moreover, it cannot be said that
the carrier-to-carrier prices established under the Act are the only
available mechanism for securing just compensation in the event of a
taking or breach of contract. As the next Part illustrates, several dif-
ferent sources of potential compensation remain untapped. And if all
else fails, a LEC can bring an action against the United States for
money damages under the Tucker Act.63
62 See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 386-93 (1974) (holding that pipelines' chal-
lenge to deregulation of small producer prices was premature since effect on individual
carriers was unknown); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-72 (1968) (sus.
taining natural gas rate structure which set area maximum rates with broad guarantees of
special relief); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1944) (sustaining system of
maximum rent setting for housing in defense area, which included provision for filing of
protest with Administrator); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 428-31 (1944) (sus-
taining maximum price fixing system for commodities, which included provision for filing
of protest with Price Administrator).
63 A bcker Act remedy remains available as long as the governmental action said to
create a taking has been authorized "'expressly or by necessary implication' by an act of
Congress. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 127 n.16 (1974) (quoting Hooe v.
United States, 218 U.S. 332, 336 (1910)); see also id. at 136 (holding that Tucker Act reme-
dies were available for takings affected by Rail Act). The Court of Claims has construed
this to mean that the governmental action must flow from "the good faith implementation
of a Congressional Act." Southern Cal. Fin. Corp. v. United States, 634 F.2d 521, 523-25
(Ct. C1. 1980).
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2. Rate Orders as Private Redistribution
Alternatively, the confiscation cases that appear to sanction in-
junctions of rate orders may rest on the assumption that little more is
at stake in these controversies than a private dispute between two eco-
nomic interests over the division of economic rents. A dispute be-
tween a monopoly railroad and a group of politically influential
shippers would fit this conception. If all that is at stake is shifting the
private distribution of income from one private interest to another,
then perhaps it is not appropriate to postpone the takings inquiry. In-
deed, if the consequence of postponement is to externalize the cost of
the redistribution to the taxpayers through a subsequent suit against
the government for money damages, then the incentives to seek these
private redistributions may be accentuated. This interpretation gains
some support from the fact that most of the cases that have articulated
the general rule (no injunction) have not involved transfers from A to
B, but rather have been challenges brought against some sort of gen-
eral land use planning or environmental regulation designed to pro-
vide external benefits or public goods to a wide cross section of
society.64
Again, whatever the validity of the private redistribution inter-
pretation of the confiscation cases, this is not a complete or accurate
characterization of what is at stake in the access pricing disputes under
the Telecommunications Act. Whether the FCC and the state com-
missions adopt forward-looking or backward-looking pricing methods
will of course have some short-run effect on the distribution of income
between investors in different industries. But as we explain in Part
III, most economists, joined by the FCC and most state PUCs, believe
that much more rides on the outcome of this dispute. Adoption of
There can be no question that the adoption of forward-looking pricing for network
elements and access charges reflects a "good faith implementation" of the Telecommunica-
tions Act. Indeed, as the FCC has found, some such standard is essential to the successful
implementation of the Act. See Local Competition Order, supra note 29, 1 620. Thus, it
would appear that a 'lhcker Act remedy exists for any taking or breach of contract created
by the pricing decisions of the FCC and the PUCs.
64 See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990) (rejecting as premature claim that
statute that allowed ICC to convert unused railroad rights of way into recreational trails,
notwithstanding reversionary property interests, was unconstitutional); MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (rejecting as unripe claim that Plan-
ning Commission determination regarding land use constituted taking); filliamson County
Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) (same); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984) (rejecting as premature claim that arbitra-
tion and compensation scheme of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act was
unconstitutional); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
294-96 (1981) (rejecting facial challenge to constitutionality of Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977).
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forward-looking prices for unbundled network elements and access is
regarded as critical for achievement of the goals of the Act. In effect,
such pricing is considered a necessary step toward realization of the
public purposes embodied in the Act of Congress (the "public use" if
it turns out there is a taking).65 This suggests that the general rule (no
injunction) is the correct one to apply here, in order to ensure that the
public policy Congress adopts is not frustrated. If realization of that
policy entails a taking, then the proper remedy is to enforce the policy,
including any steps deemed necessary by those charged with its ad-
ministration, and to require those that suffer any taking of property as
a consequence of the policy to seek appropriate compensation after
the fact.
If we are correct that any taking or breach of contract caused by
the Act should be remedied by ex post compensation, then this also
has important implications for other constitutional claims of Sidak and
Spulber and the LECs. Sidak and Spulber argue that the introduction
of competition into the local telephone industry may also be chal-
lenged as a regulatory taking under the three-part Penn Central test,66
and may be characterized as a permanent physical occupation of LEC
property under the Loretto decision. 67 Some incumbent LECs have
advanced similar arguments and also have argued, with greater plausi-
bility, that the physical collocation requirements of the Telecommuni-
cations Act represent a permanent physical occupation of their
property.68 Without addressing the merits of these arguments, it
should be enough to note that as long as the Act includes mechanisms
which can provide just compensation for any takings claims found to
have merit, these claims, too, should provide no basis to halt the im-
plementation of the Act in the manner deemed most appropriate by
regulators to achieve its purposes.
65 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midriff, 467 U.S. 224, 241 (1984) ("IT]he Court's cases
have repeatedly stated that 'one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be
paid."' (quoting Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 320 U.S. 55, 80 (1937))).
66 See Penn Cent. ransp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying
three significant factors in takings inquiry); see also Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 941-
46 (applying three-part Penn Central test in regulatory context).
67 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(holding that permanent physical occupation is taking without regard to public benefit or
economic impact); see also Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 946-53 (applying Loretto test
to mandatory interconnection or unbundling).
68 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (expressly authorizing physical collo.
cation, and overruling Bell Ati. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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ECONOMICS OF THE ISSUES
A. On the Probable Magnitude of Stranded Investment.
Pertinent Differences Between Local Telecommunications
and Electricity
We have argued that two considerations may be legally significant
in determining the remedies for a taking or breach of regulatory con-
tract. The first is the finality with which the responsible administra-
tors have resolved all elements that must be determined to conclude
there has been an uncompensated taking or breach of contract. The
second is whether other avenues of relief exist to obtain compensa-
tion. Whether or not these factors are legally significant, they cer-
tainly make common sense. Both bear strongly on the probable
magnitude of stranded investment, a practical consideration which
regulators and courts should be anxious to ascertain.
Unfortunately, it is impossible at this stage in the implementation
of the Act to predict with any precision exactly what the magnitude of
stranded investment, if any, will be. That amount will depend on a
number of variables: (1) whether and how quickly other firms will
construct new facilities to compete against incumbent LEGs; (2) how
many consumers will switch to the new facilities of the competing
LECs; and (3) how much revenue incumbent LEGs will lose as a re-
sult of this stranded plant after netting out their lost market share
against overall market growth.
Rather than venture any guesses about these variables, we will
proceed in a more qualitative and comparative fashion, offering some
observations about the differences between local telephony and elec-
tricity in terms of the probable magnitude of stranded plant that will
result from the introduction of competition.
As should be evident, the magnitude of stranded costs created by
the introduction of competition into markets previously served by reg-
ulated monopolies will differ significantly from one industry to the
next and from one competitive access scheme to the next. The under-
lying principles are the same, but the pertinent variables may yield
very different results, depending on the nature of the technology in
the industry and the specific provisions of the competitive access
scheme.
It is plausible that the introduction of competition into the retail
electric power industry through a regime of unrestricted retail wheel-
ing of power would have enormous stranded plant problems for utili-
ties and regulators who adopted what proved to be high-cost sources
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of power such as nuclear plants.69 On the other hand, we doubt very
much that the regime of local telephone competition established by
the Act will give rise to similar concerns regarding stranded
investment.
There are at least five reasons why the introduction of local com-
petition under the Act is likely to present a relatively small stranded
plant problem, at least relative to what might happen if unrestricted
retail wheeling were introduced into the electric industry. First, com-
petition in the early years is likely to be based on leasing rather than
building duplicate systems, and if lease prices are compensatory, this
will result in no stranded plant. Second, technological change renders
some telecommunications plant and equipment obsolete at a rate
more rapid than that in many industries. Third, local telephone plant
has proven to be highly adaptable to multiple uses, suggesting that a
loss in traditional local telephone service can be offset by the growth
in demand for alternative services. Fourth, the prospect of entry into
the long distance market offers a huge new source of revenue that
must be attributed in part to the local plant of the LECs. And finally,
the Act provides another offset by requiring that the FCC adopt com-
petitively neutral universal service fees to cover the costs of incum-
bency burdens. We will elaborate briefly on each of these
considerations.
1. Facilities-Based Competition Will Be Delayed
Unlike the electric power industry, the incumbent suppliers of the
bulk of local telecommunications services do not constitute a set of
high-cost producers burdened by critical decisions taken in the past
committing them to technology that proved afterwards to be far more
costly than reasonably foreseeable. With respect to the key compo-
nents of local telephone technology-switching, transmission lines,
and data processing-little difference exists among the different carri-
ers. Thus, there is little opportunity for entrants into local activity to
make immediate and dramatic inroads on incumbent monopolists
through facilities-based competition, i.e., by building a duplicate sys-
tem using alternative (cheaper) technology. The absence of immedi-
ate opportunities for exploitation of alternative technology means, in
turn, that access to local markets in the early years under the Act will
69 See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274,
35,278 (proposed June 29, 1994) (stating that electric utilities could face $200 billion or
more in stranded costs due to wholesale and retail wheeling).
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primarily take place through the leasing of considerable portions of
the incumbent LEC's physical plant.7o
Leasing rather than building has extremely significant conse-
quences in terms of stranded plant. If the leased portion of the local
system is priced properly, then there will be no stranded investment
problem. The LEC will either use its local plant for its own purposes
or will lease its facilities to competing carriers, presumably at compen-
satory prices. All portions of the physical plant are likely to be
deployed fully and will earn a competitive return; there will be no
violation of the Takings Clause or the regulatory contract.
2. The Useful Life of Telephone Technology Is Comparatively Short
It is also important that telephone technology is changing rapidly,
particularly as analog equipment is extensively replaced by digital
equipment. Consequently, the useful life of much modem telephone
plant is short, at least relative to that of the electric industry. 1 Equip-
ment scheduled to be replaced or abandoned because of technological
change clearly cannot be considered stranded investment.
3. Telephone Technology Is Adaptable to Multiple Uses
Another feature of telephone technology that reduces or pre-
cludes the stranded cost problem is its high adaptability to multiple
uses. Because of technological advances in switching, transmission,
and data processing, a system originally designed to transmit voice
messages can now also send pictures (faxes) and computer files (e-
mail), and soon will likely be able to transmit cable television and re-
mote video signals. Hence, if and when the incumbent LEC's share of
the local exchange market declines because of facilities-based compe-
tition, demand for the system resulting from new technological uses
and services may grow to the point where existing plant is still fully or
largely deployed. In sharp contrast, a nuclear generating plant has
only one economical use-the generation of electricity. If new
sources of power like gas turbines emerge that can produce the same
power at much lower prices, then the introduction of competition is
70 The Act and the FCC's implementing regulations expressly permit competing ex-
change carriers to purchase unbundled network elements from incumbents or to lease en-
tire local exchange services at wholesale prices. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(3), (c)(4) (West
Supp. 1997).
71 It has been estimated that 60% of local Bell Operating Company plant vwas acquired
after January 1,1990, and that newer vintage plant replaces older plant at the rate of about
5% to 10% per year. See Lee L. Selwyn & Patricia D. Kravtin, Analysis of Incumbent
LEC Embedded Investment: An Empirical Perspective on the "Gap" between Historic
Costs and Forwardlooking TSLRIC 4, CC Dkt. No. 96-98 (May 30, 1996).
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likely to result in severe redundancy for the ill-fated owners of nuclear
plants.
4. Offsetting Interexchange Revenues
Another critical consideration-this one stemming from the
structure of the Act-is the presence of a quid pro quo for loss of
LEC earnings. It is artificial and inappropriate to consider the poten-
tial loss of local market share by incumbent LECs without weighing it
against the other momentous changes affecting the LECs which are
made possible by the Act. In particular, the opening of markets re-
quired by the Telecommunications Act is a two-way street. Incum-
bent LECs must give up their monopoly positions in the market for
local exchange service, but in return they can expect to gain access to
interexchange (long distance) markets.72 The additional revenues
from long distance services must be regarded as an offset against the
local revenue losses that may occur. The LECs obviously regarded
the prospect of tapping into this new source of revenue as substantial
compensation for the loss of their local monopolies, since they pushed
hard for the adoption of the Telecommunications Act for this very
reason.73
Traditionally, analysis of confiscation claims has been separated
along jurisdictional lines, with the adequacy of revenues from FCC
regulated activities considered separately from the adequacy of reve-
nues from state regulated activities.74 This may suggest, for example,
that the state PUCs (which have traditionally regulated local exchange
service) should not consider offsetting revenues from the inter-
exchange market (traditionally regulated by the FCC) in determining
whether introducing competition into the local market is a taking.
But a fundamental purpose of the Act is to tear down these artificial
jurisdictional lines and create a single electronic communications mar-
ket.75 Therefore, proper constitutional analysis should look to the to-
tal revenues a LEC derives from all telecommunications services
causally attributable to its fixed plant investment. If the same statute
that takes away local revenues with one hand returns new interstate
revenues with the other, it makes no sense to slice up the same asset
72 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1997).
73 See Hazlett, supra note 10, at 223-34 (discussing motivations behind LEC lobby).
74 See Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1930) (stating that distin-
guishing between telephone company's interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and
expenses was "essential to the appropriate recognition of the competent governmental au-
thority in each field of regulation").
75 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that one purpose of Act was to
create efficient and accessible worldwide wire and radio communications service).
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(the LEC's network) into different jurisdictional components and then
declare a taking in the part that is losing revenue while ignoring the
other side of the equation. Furthermore, even if courts retain the old
jurisdictional distinctions in assessing confiscation claims, the courts
should disregard them in deciding whether forward-looking pricing is
unfair to LEC investors.
5. Universal Service Fees
Finally, the Telecommunications Act contains important provi-
sions designed to ensure that incumbency burdens do not fall exclu-
sively on the shoulders of the incumbent LECs. The principal
incumbency burden is the actual or perceived requirement that the
incumbent LEC serve as the carrier of last resort for all potential cus-
tomers. In some cases this could entail providing service to rural and
residential customers at nonremunerative rates. Here, the Act re-
quires that all cross subsidies designed to maintain universal service
be made explicit,7 6 and that "[a]1I providers of telecommunications
services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution
to the preservation and advancement of universal service. '7 The
FCC was required to adopt rules carrying out these provisions by the
summer of 1997.78 The revenues that LECs Wil receive from these
charges surely must also be taken into account before deciding
whether any losses associated with stranded plant violate the Takings
Clause or are a breach of the regulatory contract.
It is too early to say that the foregoing features of the local com-
petition scheme introduced by the Telecommunications Act mean that
LECs will experience no stranded investment. Indeed, that is part of
the point: the effect of each of these influences cannot be assessed
until the Act is carried out fully. At the very least, however, it is inap-
propriate to assume that these industry and statutory influences are
not present, or that the stranded plant problem will be so severe that a
taking or breach of contract will inevitably occur unless access prices
are adjusted to permit full recovery of all historical costs. Again, it
appears that the wiser course is to permit forward-looking pricing to
go into effect and to put off as premature any inquiry into the need for
additional compensation.
76 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(e) (West Supp. 1997).
77 Id. § 254(b)(4).
78 See id. § 254(a)(2) (stating that FCC must complete proceeding to implement provi-
sion within 15 months of February 8, 1996).
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B. On the Economics of Public Interest Pricing:
The Key Role of the Competitive-Market Model
We also suggested in Part I.B. that the selection of legal remedies
may turn on whether the regulatory action that produces these effects
is considered to serve broad and important public purposes. Hence, it
is important to review briefly why the features of the pricing rules,
which have been endorsed by most economists and adopted by the
FCC, are essential to achieving the Act's objectives.
The Telecommunications Act is designed to do nothing less than
open all electronic communications markets to effective competition
in order to serve the public interest.79 If it achieves this goal, it should
stimulate technological innovation, improve the convenience and
quality of service, and result in reductions in real prices. The simplest
way to attain this goal would be to introduce competition throughout
the industry at once. But that is not possible, at least in the short run,
given the high cost of replication of the LECs' critical bottleneck facil-
ities such as copper wire local loops. Consequently, it is necessary to
substitute regulation for competition in the pricing of these bottleneck
facilities until effective competition is established securely. Only regu-
lation based on competitive-market behavior can smooth the transi-
tion to the competitive regime, which is the basic goal of the Act.
1. The Role of Forward-Looking Costs and Monopoly Profits
For regulation to provide consumers the benefits of competition,
the regulatory rules must replicate the behavior in competitive mar-
kets.80 Prices that incorporate supercompetitive or monopoly profits
constitute a clear violation of the rules of behavior of the competitive-
market model. Such high prices invite rivals to undercut the incum-
bent and take its customers away. Thus, any pricing rule that is con-
sistent with the competitive model must, at a minimum, rule out
supercompetitive prices and monopoly profits.
Competitive-market forces also require firms to base their prices
on forward-looking costs-the current and future costs that the firm
will incur in providing goods and services to consumers. If prices do
not cover those costs, they clearly cannot be compensatory. And since
79 The Conference Report indicated that the purpose of the Act is "to provide for a
pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies
and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition."
H.R Rep. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996).
80 For a more complete treatment of the points in this subsection, see William J.
Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony 93-116 (1994) (ana-
lyzing efficient component-pricing rule for pricing of inputs used by competitors).
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competition also prevents cross subsidies, the firm whose prices fail to
cover forward-looking costs can expect financial difficulties. On the
other hand, if the firm adopts prices far above its forward-looking
costs, that will permit rivals to take its customers away. Therefore,
competitive markets force firms to adapt their prices to forward-look-
ing costs. Economic efficiency demands such pricing behavior be-
cause only prices based on forward-looking costs send the right signals
to purchasers, requiring them to pay for their purchases an amount
that corresponds to the costs actually caused by their purchases.
For similar reasons, the competitive-market model requires that
the firm's assets be valued for pricing purposes on the basis of the
costs of replicating those assets today (their replacement cost), not
based on the cost originally incurred to construct them, as recorded in
the books of the LEC. That is how assets are valued in any truly com-
petitive market, because any firm which seeks to collect a price more
than sufficient to recoup this amount makes itself vulnerable to the
competition of a new and efficient rival that can offer the product at a
lower price. Thus, the pertinent costs of assets are also forward-look-
ing, not historical.
Prices based on historical cost are also a source of economic inef-
ficiency and are therefore harmful to the public. Such prices will, for
example, distort entry decisions by making it possible for inefficient
entrants to succeed if the incumbent's final-product prices are inflated
by historical asset-cost figures that exceed replacement costs. Alter-
natively, if historical costs happen to fall short of current replacement
costs, they will distort the process by preventing the entry of efficient
potential competitors.
For all these reasons, it is clear that the competitive model, as
implicit in the goals of the Act, requires that prices be based on for-
ward-looking costs and precludes supercompetitive prices and monop-
oly profits. The economic analysis that calls for the use of forward-
looking costs is consistent with the language of the Act governing ac-
cess-pricing standards 1 and has been endorsed by the FCC and by
most of the state PUCs that have faced the issueP It should carry a
81 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth standards for determin-
ing fair rates).
82 See Local Competition Order, supra note 29, ll 673, 6S2-740 (describing "forvard-
looking, cost based pricing standard"); see also In re AT&T Communications, Op. No. 97-
2, No. 95-C-0657 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 1, 1997); In re AT&T Communications,
Dkt. No. 1662 (Tex. P.U.C. Dec. 19, 1996); In re AT&T Communications, No. 96-752-TP-
ARB (Ohio P.U.C. Dec. 5,1996); In re AT&T Communications, Op. No. 96-31, No. 96-C-
0723 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 29, 1996).
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strong presumption of validity in the courts that review regulators'
pricing decisions.
2. Misunderstandings That the Sidak-Spulber Discussion Can
Produce
Sidak and Spulber undoubtedly accept the conclusions that in
competitive markets the costs relevant for pricing are forward-look-
ing, that the pertinent asset costs in such markets are their replace-
ment costs, and that the competitive-market model also rules out
supercompetitive prices and monopoly profits. However, in their dis-
cussion of the economics of access-pricing rules, they emphasize two
additional criteria. First, they stress that economic efficiency requires
access prices to be competitively neutral, in the sense that they must
entail the same price for access to unbundled local network elements
both to incumbents and to new entrants.83 Second, they urge that ac-
cess prices not abrogate regulatory commitments that served to elicit
funding by investors in the past, because abrogation can lead to diffi-
culties for the firm in raising needed capital in the future.84
Most economists, including those who have appeared as witnesses
on both sides in contested proceedings involving competitive access,
would endorse these additional criteria in principle. Yet the Sidak-
Spulber discussion can lead to misunderstanding because of three po-
sitions they appear to take. Starting with a legitimate concern with
protecting investor expectations, they appear to suggest that: (1) com-
petitive neutrality requires access prices to include a substantial con-
tribution to the costs imposed on the LECs by their universal-service
obligations;85 (2) the regulatory contract requires investors to recoup
the historical cost of the assets in which they invested, even if this
exceeds the current replacement cost of those assets;86 and (3) even if
the regulated firm previously had been earning monopoly profits, dep-
rivation of those profits without full compensation constitutes an im-
permissible taking.87 The modifications of the pricing rules apparently
required by these observations clearly conflict with the requirements
of the competitive-market model for regulation and could lead to sub-
stantial distortions and inefficiencies.
83 See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 973 (discussing efficient component-pricing
rule as mechanism for determining access charges).
84 See id. at 886-87, 989-90 (arguing that investors may hesitate to guarantee funding to
utility if regulatory policies prevented it from recovering stranded costs).
85 See id. at 869-74 (noting that incumbent firms may otherwise be disadvantaged by
regulation).
86 See id. at 958-59.
87 See id. at 968-71.
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a. Competitive Neutrality and Universal Service. The first addi-
tional requirement stressed by Sidak and Spulber is that access prices
must be competitively neutral, in the sense that they should impose no
differential handicap on either incumbent or entrant. A special pric-
ing formula for achievement of this objective, called the efficient com-
ponent-pricing rule (ECPR) or "parity pricing," has been devised.83
The rationale for competitive neutrality is not too difficult to ex-
plain intuitively. The incumbent owner of a bottleneck or essential
facility may well have the incentive to overcharge for access to the
facility in order to minimize effective competition from entrants.
Competitive neutrality requires that the price the owner of the bottle-
neck facility charges to its competitors for access to the facility be the
same as the amount the bottleneck owner must itself forgo when it
uses the facility. If the bottleneck owner charges a higher access price
to rivals than it charges to itself, it will be able to outcompete those
rivals, even if they are the more efficient providers of the final prod-
ucts in question. The reverse will be true if rivals pay less for access
than the bottleneck owner does, because an inefficient competitor
may be able to take the final-product business away from an efficient
bottleneck owner. In either case, the business may go to an inefficient
supplier forcing the consuming public to bear the unnecessary costs.
The issue arises in the context of local telephone competition pri-
marily because regulators have imposed universal-service obligations
upon the LECs in the past. That is, they have required the LECs to
provide local service to household customers at prices that do not
cover the pertinent incremental costs in order to make telephone sub-
scription as widespread as possible.P If the LECs were forced to bear
the entire cost of the shortfall in serving these customers with no con-
tribution from entrants, then competitive neutrality indeed would be
violated.
But clearly this is not what the Act requires. Rather, the Act
mandates that a universal service fund be established to which all en-
trants will have to contribute suitable amounts. 9o If these amounts are
determined appropriately, then competitive neutrality will be pre-
served without any need to manipulate access charges for that
purpose.
88 The rule was formulated by Robert D. Willig, and one of the present authors has
been substantially involved in its propagation. See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 80, at 95-
97 (explaining efficient component-pricing rule).
89 See Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History. A Reconstruction, 18
Telecomm. Pol'y 352 (1993).
90 See supra Part ILA.5.
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b. The Regulatory Contract and Historical Costs of As-
sets. Sidak and Spulber also suggest that implied regulatory commit-
ments require that investors be allowed to recoup the full historical
costs of their investments, but not the replacement cost of their assets.
Yet, as discussed above,91 all that investors can legitimately expect is
that they will be permitted to earn a rate of return on their invest-
ments (including recoupment through depreciation) that is consistent
with the competitive-market standard. In effect, investors have been
protected from the losses that a failed competitive enterprise would
suffer, but they also have been precluded from enjoying the high earn-
ings of a very successful competitive firm. Instead, they have been
promised the opportunity to earn returns that one could expect from
investment in an average competitive firm of comparable risk and av-
erage profitability. The implication is that the regulatory contract
promises no more than the recoupment of asset values that competi-
tive markets provide on the average-the replacement cost of those
assets, not their historical cost. We see no reason to believe that the
regulatory contract requires compensation greater than this.92
c. Deprivation of the Opportunity to Charge Supercompetitive
Prices or Prices That Include Some Monopoly Profit. Numerous
passages in the Sidak and Spulber article appear to imply that depriv-
ing an investor of any expected earnings by a new law or a revised
regulation is an indefensible act, damaging to economic efficiency and
in violation of the Constitution.93 Surely, they do not mean that.
Deprivation of the right to charge supercompetitive prices or to
charge prices that contain monopoly elements can be likened to the
deprivation of future loot suffered by a burglar when a new law facili-
tates his arrest and conviction. Moreover, we cannot conceive of any
regulator suggesting that such pricing practices are entitlements sub-
ject to regulatory protection. Sidak and Spulber are well aware that
such pricing practices are inconsistent with the competitive-pricing
model. They are also well aware that such pricing undermines eco-
nomic efficiency in general and, in particular, the efficiency properties
of competitive neutrality in access pricing.94
91 See supra Parts I.A.2.b. & I.A.2.c.
92 Certainly, one of the authors, William Baumol, and Robert Willig have addressed
repeatedly the proper valuation of assets in railroad regulation and consistently have taken
the position that replacement cost is the proper test, even when they were testifying on
behalf of a railroad that was to be the recipient of access charges.
93 See, e.g., Sidak & Spulber, supra note 1, at 919-20, 925, 958.
94 This is clearly spelled out in the two Baumol-Sidak books on telephone and electric-
ity regulation. See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 80, at 108-09 (arguing that allowing utili-
ties to charge monopoly rates, not optimal input-pricing rule, causes inefficiency). See
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The implication that follows for the pricing of unbundled network
elements and access to the LECs' local networks is profound. The
methods for determining those prices should preclude any opportu-
nity to set them at supercompetitive levels. The rules proposed by the
FCC to carry out the Telecommunications Act do this, and that is one
of their major benefits. To block adoption of those rules before their
full implications for the Act's future have been realized would be a
profound disservice to consumers.
I
CONCLUDING Co1,SMNT
We have found no reason to conclude, on the basis of either law
or economic analysis, that the pricing rules accompanying the intro-
duction of competition into the local telephone exchange market must
provide for the recovery of the historical costs that incumbent LECs
incurred while operating as monopolies. Recovery of historical costs
is not required by the Takings Clause or the regulatory contract. And
providing for recovery of historical costs would violate the precepts of
the competitive-market model, which must be observed if the Act's
public interest purposes are to be realized.
We have also concluded that the constitutional day of reckoning
can and should be postponed until the Act is in full operation. Given
the nature of the telecommunications industry and the mitigating pro-
visions of the Act, there is substantial reason to think that the intro-
duction of local competition will produce only minimal stranded
investment, and perhaps none at all. This is not to say that isolated
cases that entail the need for special adjustment will not arise. But it
does suggest that the forward-looking pricing standards for competi-
tive access, which economists and many regulators have endorsed,
need not be abandoned out of fear that, without substantial alteration,
they will inevitably give rise to violations of the Constitution.
Sidak and Spulber have made a considerable contribution to our
understanding of an important and complex subject, primarily by re-
minding us of the importance of protecting investors' legitimate reli-
ance interests. But their discussion is also likely to lead to important
misapprehensions, because it does not recognize the special attributes
of the telecommunications industry, because it does not take into ac-
count competitive neutrality provisions such as the universal service
fund, and because it does not take note of the critical role of forward-
looking costs and forward-looking valuation of assets.
generally Widliam J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Transmission Pricing and Stranded Costs
in the Electric Power Industry (1995).
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